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Sexuality and the “System of Liberty”: 
Comment on Stolzenberg 
WILLIAM A. GALSTON* 
I begin my commentary on Stolzenberg=s beautifully crafted paper 
with the question of this conference: What is the state’s interest in 
marriage?  As phrased, this question is underspecified.  There is no 
reason to believe that different kinds of states will have the same interest 
in marriage.  (Recall the conceptions of marriage and family in Plato’s 
Republic or, if you prefer a real-world example, the kibbutzim of the 
mid-twentieth century.)  So let us rephrase the question before us: What 
is the interest of the liberal democratic state in marriage? 
The traditional answer begins by noting that liberal democracy is a 
system of “ordered liberty,” standing between anarchy and oppression.1  
Libertarian critics see liberal democracy as an infringement on true 
liberty, while traditionalist critics see it as disordered.  Similarly, marriage is 
often understood as a form of ordered liberty, standing between sexual 
license and asceticism.  For advocates of sexual liberty, such as Philip 
Roth’s protagonist, marriage is the negation of liberty, rightly understood.2  
For those at the other extreme, such as Tolstoy’s protagonist, marriage is 
a veneer of conventional respectability covering the reality of sexual 
relations indistinguishable in principle from licentiousness.3
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Let us inspect the critique of marriage from the standpoint of sexual 
liberty, which for better or worse is more accessible to us than 
asceticism.  For Roth’s David Kepesh, philandering represents the ideal 
of true liberty.  As Kepesh sees it, says Stolzenberg, “sex is liberty 
unmodified, . . . the only liberty worth its name.  To indulge in sexual 
promiscuity . . . is thus to be the true champion of liberty.”4  Conversely, 
Kepesh contends, marriage, love, or indeed any form of attachment is a 
form of emotional dependency that represents a surrender of freedom.  
Although Stolzenberg does not put it quite this way, Kepesh may even 
be said to deny the adequacy of our conference question: the state’s 
interest in marriage may not coincide with the individual’s interest, and 
in cases of conflict there is no compelling reason to prefer the interests 
of the state.  After all, doesn’t liberalism, rightly understood, mean that 
the state is merely an instrument to the satisfaction of individual desire?  
And why stop at consumerist desire when sexual desire is so much more 
urgent, and fundamental? 
For the purposes of this Comment, I will set aside the question whether 
Kepeshian sexual liberty is an adequate depiction of male desire (for the 
record, I think not).  The more pertinent issue is the relation between his 
stance and liberal democracy. 
The liberal democratic project, from Milton and Locke to Mill and Rawls, 
has always been to identify principled limits to the scope of personal 
freedom.  Four classic strategies have emerged.  The first is the argument 
made by advocates of the minimal state (and also in a way by Kant) that 
to sustain social relations, a system of freedom requires mutual limitations 
on individual liberty: We can determine the content of individual liberty 
by asking whether a particular individual’s claim to freedom is consistent 
with the like claims of other individuals.5  Second, liberals (Mill, for one) 
have often argued that individual liberty is the space for unimpeded 
action defined by the legitimate limits of public power.6  Third, there is a 
tradition of liberal inquiry into the relation between the attributes of 
individuals and the maintenance of liberal institutions.7  Tocquevillians 
place this inquiry in the context of civil society, which for them includes 
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the family;8 Madisonian liberals have their own version of the thesis that 
the public good depends on private character.9
We now come to the fourth strategy, namely, limits on individual 
conduct rooted in conceptions of personal development or perfection.  
There are several variants.  For those who believe that liberal democracy 
rests on theological foundations, liberal individualism rightly understood 
is a form of imitatio dei.10  There is as well a secular version of this 
thesis—a liberal normative psychology of intellect or will as standing 
above and limiting desire.11  Stolzenberg offers another variant, based on 
the proposition that love and desire, rightly understood, point us away 
from Kepesh’s view of emotional attachment as a trap and toward a 
“theory of limits that can explain when and why the condition of 
emotional dependency that attachments entail is consistent with the 
value of freedom.”12  It is in a “theory of love,” she argues, that we find 
the most satisfactory liberal account of restraints on individual conduct; 
most satisfactory because it asks us to locate limits by affirming our 
desires, once clarified through self-reflection, rather than denying them 
outright.13
This is a classic (indeed, Platonic) move.  Recall the ring of Gyges 
story in the Republic: at first blush, it appears that if we could break all 
rules of conduct with impunity, we would discard all restraint, sexual 
and otherwise, and claim unfettered freedom for ourselves while denying 
to others to the extent needed to gratify our desires.14  In short, we would 
become tyrants.  A standard response of moral philosophers is to insist 
that such conduct is unfair or unjust.  But this is a stance that Socrates 
and his interlocutors cannot embrace.  After all, why be just if it is 
not to one=s personal advantage?  The Platonic response is that properly 
understood, unrestrained erotic desires turn out to be self-limiting: What 
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we really want is not tyrannical domination over others, but rather forms 
of connection with them that enable us to glimpse, perhaps even 
participate in, a higher good while sustaining orderly social relations and 
a decent polity.   
Stolzenberg=s proposal has the merit of linking liberal freedom to 
psychological considerations far richer than the thin self-interest of homo 
economicus, and also of connecting liberal thought to the themes of 
literature and the philosophical tradition.  It must be said, however, that 
other accounts seem considerably closer to the real world of liberal 
politics and more likely to pertain to the state=s specific interest in 
marriage.  For example, it is hard to see how the minimum conditions of 
social order could be secured in circumstances of unrestrained sexual 
competition.  The alternative to “thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife” is 
not only sin but violence.  It is also hard to see how a society could 
sustain itself over time without effective ways of raising children.  As 
Stolzenberg herself observes, Kepesh walks away, not just from his wife, 
but also from his son, who cannot forgive him and is thus psychologically 
wounded and deformed.15  It is not moralism, but political prudence, to 
invoke some version of Mill’s principle: In the pursuit of personal 
gratification, I may be at liberty to harm myself, but I am not at liberty to 
harm others.16  Kepesh wants to “turn freedom into a system,”17 a classic 
liberal ideal.  But he cannot do that by turning those around him into 
casualities. 
Stolzenberg’s effort to rest ordered sexual liberty on a theory of love 
is bold, not the least because it exposes her to a high standard of 
psychological realism.  She must grapple with challenges such as the 
riposte of Tolstoy’s protagonist: “‘To love one person for a whole lifetime 
is like saying that one candle will burn a whole life.’”18  Rather than 
suggesting that sexual limits and the fulfillment of desire coincide, it 
seems more plausible to acknowledge that order always contains an 
element of renunciation.  You do not need to be a Freudian to believe 
that there is no civilization without its attendant discontents.  Indeed, 
they are the price we pay for civilization, much as we pay taxes to 
support public institutions.  The ultimate test of any form of social 
organization is whether its members can bear the sacrifices its survival 
requires. 
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